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THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATIONS 
OF THE DOUBLE SYLLOGISM 
0. The term double syllogism appeared in scientific research in the early 90's to denote 
a semantic-pragmatic construction as pait of text meaning analysis, first in Hungárián 
(BÉKÉSI 1991a, 1991b), then in Germán (BÉKÉSI 1994). Two authors have directly dis-
cussed double syllogism in their logical systematizing papers: Avi SIÓN (Sión 
1990/1996), and JONATHAN DOLHENTY (no year speciíied). Both studies became widely 
accessible with the Internet gaining popularity.* 
0.1. Logical interpretations of double syllogism 
0 . 1 . 1 . JONATHAN DOLHENTY arrived at a description and application of "double syl-
logisms" through an analysis of compound syllogisms, which he approached, as a first 
step, in the course of examining the overt or covert "compound propositions" appearing 
in syllogisms (ibid., Ch. 4, 1-2). For the purposes of this topic, the analysis of covertly 
multiple syllogisms is particularly relevant; among them, especially the propositions 
called exclusive, containing an exclusive lexeme liké „only", ,.just", „exclusively", or 
„alone". Such exclusive lexemes represent covert propositions, thereby adding one extra 
proposition: 
First proposition: Second proposition: 
Only the evil are rich. Those who are not evil are not rich. 
DOLHENTY suggests that the second proposition is the tool, rather than the result, of 
the argument. He considers double syllogism as a compound logical figure used, among 
other things, to confírm the proposition building role of exclusive lexemes: that is, to con-
firm the existence of a covert second proposition complementing the explicit propositioa 
The easiest way to follow DOLHENTY'S concept is by applying a syllogism with both its 
piemises containing the exclusive „exclusively" lexeme. 
Exclusively the rich are happy. 
Exclusively the evil are rich. 
Therefore, exclusively the evil are happy. 
According to the author, „Both preinises contain two covert propositions" (ibid. Ch. 
4, 5-7). The major premise is composed of the following two propositions: 
The rich are happy and 
Everyone who is not rich is not happy. 
The minor premise contains the following two propositions: 
Study no. 1 will be published for the first time here, Studies no. 3 and 4 appeared in the 2003 
and 2004 issues of "Sprachtheorie und germanistisches Linguistik", respectively. 
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The evil are rich and 
Everyone who is not evil is not happy. 
„Both arguments are valid" - states DOLHENTY. Consequently, we can combine the 
conclusion of the first syllogism (The evil are rich) with the conclusion of the second 
syllogism (Everyone who is not evil is not happy). 
In this way, the formula of double syllogism acquires a confirming role, whereby 
both the first and the second syllogism follow the first figure of syllogisms (M-P, S-M, 
S-P), with the major premises all being universal, and the minor ones - assertive: 
First syllogism: Second syllogism: 
M - P The rich are happy, and Everyone who is not rich is not happy 
S - M The evil are rich and Everyone who is not evil is not rich. 
S - P The evil are happy, and Everyone who is not evil is not happy. 
By combining the conclusion of the first and the second syllogism ( S - P and S - P), 
one can cieate the single exclusive proposition: „Exclusively the evil are happy". 
0 .1 .2 . Avi SIÓN pubüshed the first version of his study bearing a promising title (Fu-
ture Logic) in 1990, and re-worked it in 1996; this latter version is available on the In-
ternet (S ION ,1996) . The author discusses double syllogism in the summarizing Chapter 
52. Here, he focuses on the elementary and compound character of propositions con-
tained in various types of operations. Of these, we are interested in the compound cha-
racter of propositions. Here both quantity or extensional and - through a concessive re-
lation in the second syllogism - deontic modality play a role: 
First syllogism: Second syllogism: 
All M are P, and all P must be M, 
Somé S are M, though these S can not-be M, 
So Somé S are P, though these S can not-be P. 
It is not by accident that the first and second syllogism constitute a whole identified 
as double syllogism in the piesent case. Actually, they represent, in the first place, the 
most immediate constituents of a paradigm consisting of four figures, well-known in 
logic. Here we have the terms of the two major premises arranged in reverse order (M -
P, and P - M); the order of the minor premises and alsó that of the conclusions are iden-
tical (S - M, S - P). 
In SION'S interpretalion, terms related with the conjunctions and and though 
represent parts constituting a mixed modality system. That provides the framework in 
which a logical analysis of the compound propositions takes place in the same médium 
of examination as the semantic-pragmatic research outlined below. However, it goes 
without saying that this latter relies on a "practical", rather than formai, concept of syl-
logism, similarly, using Shakespeare's well-known example, to LAUSBERG: 
„ Well, think of marriage now (= propositio): younger than you, / here in 
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Verona,... / are made already mothers ( = premissa maior)... / 1 was your mother 
much upon these years / that you are now a maid (= premissa minor). Thus then in brief 
(= concIusio-Formel): the valiant Paris seeks you for his love (conclusio, die inhaltlich 
nur eine konkrété ratio der propositio ist). ( R J 1 , 3 , 6 9 : LAUSBERG 1 9 6 3 . p.L 1 9 ) 
0.2. Double syüogism as a semantic-pragmatic figure 
The term double syllogism as used here refers to ünguistic usage where deductive 
reasoning may take not one, but two, simultaneous or consecutive paths in the argumen-
tation of natumi texts. In its most evident manifestation, the conjunction but in the role 
of denial of expectation models the contmdiction between an implicit assertive first ele-
ment and an explicit subsequent element of negation. Since, however, the two contradic-
torily related elements are both conclusions, at the same time, of deductive reasoning, 
the interlocutor may be bale to reconstruct the implicit major or minor premises, provid-
ing that he has somé knowledge of the state of affairs described. Double syllogism is thus 
an initial structure bearing a semantic-pragmatic character. It has been created to analyze 
the structure embracing the ów/-relation. It builds on the hypothesis that the conjunction 
but models the contmdiction between two syllogistic conclusions, rather than that be-
tween two elementary items. 
0.2.1. Representing double syllogism 
Let us signify the terms of the two syllogisms with the symbols (Apr), (Ap), (Aq), 
and (Bpr), (Bp), (Bq), respectively. (A) is the first syllogism, (B) stands for the second. 
(Apr) is the major premise of the first syllogism, (Bpr) is the major piemise of the 
second syllogism. These meaning components are mostly implicit (as indicated by the 
asterisk symbol): (Apr*), (Bpr*). (Ap) is the minor premise of the first syllogism, (Aq) 
is the conclusion (concluding term) of the first syllogism. (Bp) is the minor premise of 
the second syllogism, (Bq) is the conclusion (concluding term) of the second syllogism. 
The major premise is the linguistic formuládon of the conceived/known, etc. generál ex-
perience about the piece of reality represented in the utterance, occasionally containing a 
pragmatic presupposition. 
Here is an example: 
Gyerekkoromban [Lit.] In my childhood, 
boldog lehettem volna, I couldhave been happy 
de nem értettem hozzá. Butldid notknow how to do that. 
Felnőttkoromban In my adulthood, 
boldog lehettem volna, I could have been happy 
de nem értem rá. But I did not have the time. 
Öregkoromban In my old age, 
boldog lehetnék, I could be happy 
de a közelgő halál okozná. But that would be due to oncoming death. 
(Weöres Sándor: De) (Sándor Weöres: But) 
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The contradiction of the direct relation on the surface stnicture of the rhyme cited 
above holds between the two - explicit and implicit - conclusions: 
(Aq) I could have been happy but (Bq*) I wasn't, 
(Aq) I could have been happy but (Bq*) I wasn't 
(Aq) I could be happy but (Bq*) I can't 
It follows from the above relations that the explicit contradictoiy closing sentence of 
each verse appears as a (Bp), i.e., a minor premise: ..., but I was not happy because 
(Aq) I could have been happy but (Bp) I did not know how to do that. 
(Aq) I could have been happy but (Bp) I did not have the time. 
(Aq) I could be happy but (Bq*) that would be due-to oncoming death. 
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